Verstehen ist nicht nur ein Grundbegriff menschlicher Lebensfuhrung und Lebenswelt, sondern besitzt auch in der Philosophie und den verschiedenen Wissenschaften eine zentrale Bedeutung. Die Frage nach der Moglichkeit von Verstehen ist dabei immer auch die Frage nach dem Subjekt und Objekt des Verstandnisses. Wer versteht wen oder was? Ist "Verstehen" also nur rationales Erfassen, Erkennen tieferer Einsichten und komplexerer Zusammenhange oder impliziert es mehr? Versteht man den Anderen, den Fremden, aber auch den Text wirklich so einfach? Und wenn ja, wie (...) strukturiert sich dieses Verstehen? Es soll in dem interdisziplinaren Band versucht werden, mit den genannten Fragen Anschlussfahigkeit zu evozieren, so dass die Vieldimensionalitat des Verstehens thematisiert und nach Funktion, Leistung und Grenzen des Verstehens vor allem in Philosophie, Geistes- und Naturwissenschaft gefragt werden kann. Mit Beitragen von Christina Brandt, Selin Gerlek, Julia Gruevska, Felix Huttemann, Bernhard Irrgang, Gudrun Kuhne-Bertram, Hans-Ulrich Lessing, Kevin Liggieri, Kate Meyer-Drawe, Sabine Ohlenbusch, Tobias Schlicht, Gunter Scholtz und Volker Steenblock. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Internationales Jahrbuch für philosophische Anthropologie Jahrgang: 7 Heft: 1 Seiten: 285-292.

Die Geisteswissenschaften zu verstehen, was sie sind und was sie erreichen konnen, ist heute, hundert Jahre nach Diltheys Tod, eine genauso wichtige Aufgabe wie zu dessen Lebzeiten. Diltheys Argumente und seine Position einer umfassenden philosophischen Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften sind auch heute noch von Bedeutung. Seine Verteidigung der Autonomie der geistigen Welt angesichts der positivistischen Herrschaftsanspruche liefert wichtige Gesichtspunkte fur die Evaluierung geisteswissenschaftlicher Forschung. Zum 100. Todestag Diltheys zeigen zehn renommierte Forscher anhand zweier Themengebiete - 'Dilthey and Kant' sowie 'Dilthey and (...) Hermeneutics' - auf, wie Dilthey fur heutige Fragestellungen fruchtbar gemacht werden kann. Die deutsch- und englischsprachigen Beitrage sollen insbesondere jenen Wissenschaftlern dienen, die sich der methodischen Erneuerung der intellectual history, der Philosophie- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte sowie der Begriffsgeschichte verpflichtet haben. - Mit Beitragen von Benjamin D. Crowe, Annette Hilt, Theodore Kisiel, Rudolf A. Makkreel, Massimo Mezzanzanica, Jared A. Millson, Eric Sean Nelson, Frithjof Rodi, Maja Soboleva und Denis Thouard. (shrink)

Mit dieser Edition wird erstmals ein Vorlesungszyklus aus Helmuth Plessners wissenschaftlichem Nachlaß der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich gemacht. Das klar und übersichtlich gegliederte Kolleg "Elemente der Metaphysik" präsentiert in leicht verständlicher Sprache und gut nachvollziehbarer Gedankenentfaltung die Grundzüge von Plessners Anthropologie, die dieser in seinem nur schwer rezipierbaren Hauptwerk, den "Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch" von 1928, entwickelt hatte, und stellt sie in einen umfassenden philosophischen Kontext. Die Vorlesung umfaßt drei Hauptteile: Im 1. Teil, der "Metaphysik des Bewußtseins", zeigt Plessner, daß (...) der klassische bewußtseinsphilosophische Ansatz zur Beantwortung zentraler metaphysischer Probleme nicht in der Lage ist. Die entscheidende Frage nach dem Sein des Bewußtseins ist – wie Plessner nachweist – im Rahmen der Bewußtseinsproblematik, wie sie von der neuzeitlichen Philosophie seit Descartes entfaltet wurde, nicht zu beantworten. Die Bewußtseinsphilosophie muß daher – so Plessners Grundthese – durch einen lebensphilosophischen Ansatz überwunden werden. Dieser Übergang zur Problematik des Lebens und die breite Ausführung des neuen philosophischen Zugriffs steht im Mittelpunkt des 2. Teils. Plessner unternimmt hier vor allem den Versuch, das Wesen des Lebens durch das Verhältnis des Körpers zu seiner Grenze zu bestimmen und hält fest, daß solche Körper, die ihre Grenzen realisiert haben, "Positionaliät" besitzen. Dieser Begriff der Positionalität wird zum Zentralbegriff von Plessners Biophilosophie, die im Fortgang dieses Teils der Vorlesung ausführlich dargestellt wird. Im Zentrum der Darlegung, die Plessner im engen, kritischen Kontakt mit der biologischen Forschung hält, steht u.a. die Beziehung von Organismus und Umwelt, die Organisationsformen des Lebens, die Struktur der tierischen Umwelt, die Bestimmung des Bewußtseins, das Verhältnis von Bewußtsein und körperlichem Sein und das Problem des Gedächtnisses. Im abschließenden 3. Teil skizziert Plessner die Grundzüge seiner philosophischen Anthropologie, wobei er den Menschen als dasjenige Lebewesen bestimmt, das – in Abhebung vom Tier, dem eine zentrische Organisationsform zukommt – eine "exzentrische Positionalität" besitzt, und das in einem dreifachen Bezug zur Außenwelt, zur Innenwelt und zur Mitwelt steht. Die besondere Bedeutung dieser Vorlesung liegt einerseits in ihrem Charakter als leicht nachvollziehbare Hinführung zu Plessners Philosophie des Lebendigen. Andererseits enthält sie neue Inhalte – insbesondere im 1. und 2. Teil – und trägt dadurch zur Erweiterung unserer Kenntnis von Plessners Philosophie bei. (shrink)

O impulso filosófico fundamental de Dilthey é uma fundamentação filosófica das ciências humanas. Ele segue esse projeto de uma “Crítica da Razão Histórica”, como ele chegou a chamar seu plano, desde a metade dos anos 60 do século XIX até o final de sua vida em 1911. Essa intenção de uma fundamentação das ciências do homem, da sociedade e da história remete à confrontação da Escola Histórica, cujos representantes principais Dilthey conheceu durante sua época de estudante em Berlim, com o (...) positivismo franco-inglês, ou seja, o empirismo de Comte, Mill e Buckle. O presente texto procura apresentar e comentar detalhadamente esse projeto, que encontrou sua forma mais madura na obra tardia A Construção do Mundo Histórico nas Ciências Humanas (1911). (shrink)

Mit dieser Edition wird erstmals ein Vorlesungszyklus aus Helmuth Plessners wissenschaftlichem Nachlaß der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich gemacht. Das klar und übersichtlich gegliederte Kolleg "Elemente der Metaphysik" präsentiert in leicht verständlicher Sprache und gut nachvollziehbarer Gedankenentfaltung die Grundzüge von Plessners Anthropologie, die dieser in seinem nur schwer rezipierbaren Hauptwerk, den "Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch" von 1928, entwickelt hatte, und stellt sie in einen umfassenden philosophischen Kontext. Die Vorlesung umfaßt drei Hauptteile: Im 1. Teil, der "Metaphysik des Bewußtseins", zeigt Plessner, daß (...) der klassische bewußtseinsphilosophische Ansatz zur Beantwortung zentraler metaphysischer Probleme nicht in der Lage ist. Die entscheidende Frage nach dem Sein des Bewußtseins ist - wie Plessner nachweist - im Rahmen der Bewußtseinsproblematik, wie sie von der neuzeitlichen Philosophie seit Descartes entfaltet wurde, nicht zu beantworten. Die Bewußtseinsphilosophie muß daher - so Plessners Grundthese - durch einen lebensphilosophischen Ansatz überwunden werden. Dieser Übergang zur Problematik des Lebens und die breite Ausführung des neuen philosophischen Zugriffs steht im Mittelpunkt des 2. Teils ("Metaphysik des Lebens"). Plessner unternimmt hier vor allem den Versuch, das Wesen des Lebens durch das Verhältnis des Körpers zu seiner Grenze zu bestimmen und hält fest, daß solche Körper, die ihre Grenzen realisiert haben, "Positionaliät" besitzen. Dieser Begriff der Positionalität wird zum Zentralbegriff von Plessners Biophilosophie, die im Fortgang dieses Teils der Vorlesung ausführlich dargestellt wird. Im Zentrum der Darlegung, die Plessner im engen, kritischen Kontakt mit der biologischen Forschung hält, steht u.a. die Beziehung von Organismus und Umwelt, die Organisationsformen des Lebens (Pflanze und Tier), die Struktur der tierischen Umwelt, die Bestimmung des Bewußtseins, das Verhältnis von Bewußtsein und körperlichem Sein und das Problem des Gedächtnisses. Im abschließenden 3. Teil ("Der Mensch") skizziert Plessner die Grundzüge seiner philosophischen Anthropologie, wobei er den Menschen als dasjenige Lebewesen bestimmt, das - in Abhebung vom Tier, dem eine zentrische Organisationsform zukommt - eine "exzentrische Positionalität" besitzt, und das in einem dreifachen Bezug zur Außenwelt, zur Innenwelt und zur Mitwelt steht. Die besondere Bedeutung dieser Vorlesung liegt einerseits in ihrem Charakter als leicht nachvollziehbare Hinführung zu Plessners Philosophie des Lebendigen. Andererseits enthält sie neue Inhalte - insbesondere im 1. und 2. Teil - und trägt dadurch zur Erweiterung unserer Kenntnis von Plessners Philosophie bei. (shrink)

Die Dilthey-Forschung der letzten Jahre hat Dilthey tendenziell von dem Bild einer rein 'kontinentalen' Philosophie der Hermeneutik des Lebens weggerückt. Vielmehr war sein Wissenschaftsverständnis holistisch und einem umfassenden Erfahrungsbegriff verpflichtet. Statt Geistes- und Naturwissenschaften einander entgegenzusetzen, brachte er eine empiristisch eingestellte akademische Philosophie auf den Weg.

The aim of this essay is to ask whether what it calls the "presence" of things, including things of the past, can be rendered in language, including the language of historians. In Part I the essay adumbrates what it means by presence . It also proposes two ideal types: meaning-cultures , and presence-cultures . In the modern period, linguistic utterance has typically come to be used for, and to be interpreted as, the way by which meaning rather than presence is (...) expressed, thereby creating a gap between language and presence. Thus, in Part II the essay explores ways that this gap might be bridged, examining seven instances in which presence can be "amalgamated" with language. These range from instances in which the physical dimensions of language itself are made manifest, to those through which the physicality of the things to which language refers is supposed to be made evident. Of particular note for theorists of history are those instances in which things can be made present by employing the deictic, poetic, and incantatory potential of linguistic expression. The essay concludes in Part III with a reflection on Heidegger's idea that language is the "house of being," now interpreted as the idea that language can be the medium through which the separation of humans and the things of their environment may be overcome. The hope of achieving presence in language is no less than a reconciliation of humans with their world, including—and of most interest to historians—the things and events of their past. (shrink)

Having stated, in section I., what the reader may expect from this paper, I will sum up, in section II., my views on the question how to justify a moral ‚ought‘-statement (a statement of moral obligation), notably a statement of the first-person form ‚I morally ought not to act in such and such a way if and when (I believe that) I am in such und such a situation.‘ In my view, its justification should consist of two quite different parts. (...) The first part is a logical proof based on my own personal language usage (‚idiolect‘) – namely, the proof that a time-honoured and highly efficient moral principle that I suggest to call the Universalized Golden Rule (UGR) is, in my idiolect (which I think to be shared by many other speakers of any sufficiently developed natural language), a locically true conditional statement (II. 1. – 5.). This part belongs, of course, to the jobs of the philosophical ethicist (metaethicist), who has to cope with it once for all. The second part, however, is a daily task of each of us and seems to me, pace R. M. Hare, to be a kind of ‚verification‘; I use to call it a ‚Nathan-David‘ procedure and will expound it in detail (II. 6. – 9.). In section III., I will try to offer an array of more or less elaborated Nathan-David procedures to the effect that he who shares my personal idiolect, my basic preferences, and my factual knowledge cannot but consider himself morally obligated to ask for his Covid-19 vaccinations as soon as possible. In section IV., I will argue in favour of the view that the German State is not only entitled but, if need be, legally obligated to make the Covid-19 vaccination compulsary. In the final section V., I will try and give a relentless assessment of the situation, a short outlook into the future, and a succinct analysis of how to most efficiently handle the pandemic under the factual boundary conditions given. (shrink)

Hare believeded to have good reasons for stressing tho role of falsification in justifying a moral judgment. Taking this seriously, we cannot accept the objection that he should have tailored his creditor example in terns of pemission rather than in terms of prescription. Difficulties, howerer, are due to the fact that, according to Hare, respectively my volitional reaction to a fictional situation is part and parcel of moral reasoning; for this kind of evidence turns out to he no less 'verifying' (...) than 'falsifying'. So it seems that the distinction between verificationism and falsificationism, though useful in metascience, cannot properly be transferred to metaethics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Why Maturana?Hans Ulrich GumbrechtWhy would a German scholar specializing in pedagogical thought travel thousands of miles to Santiago de Chile for an interview with a aging scientist who, it seems, has created for himself a solid reputation in the field of "biology of vision" without being hailed by his peers as a path-breaking innovator? In the German intellectual context, the answer to this question could be as (...) laconic as it would be superfluous: it consists in a deictic reference to the name and, implicitly, to the work of Niklas Luhmann. American readers, in contrast, may need some introductory explanation in order to understand the epistemological triangle between contemporary pedagogical thought, Maturana's biology, and Luhmann's philosophy—and, above all, in order to assess and even to appreciate its intellectual potential.Niklas Luhmann is certainly difficult to read, at least for starters, and to those who met him during his lifetime he invariably appeared to be a dead-serious person. But today, more than five years after Luhmann's death, we begin to discover traces of a sometimes uncanny irony—one may want to call it a "practical irony"—in his writing. One of the discursive gestures that characterized Luhmann's texts were references to academic authors who nobody had ever heard of (let alone read), presented with the same seriousness and with the same attitude of intellectual reverence that we normally reserve for the classics: for example, to the logician Gotthart Guenter, the philosopher Fritz Heider, the biologist Humberto Maturana, or the mathematician George Spencer Brown. There is no doubt that, in each case, a specific concept or a specific thought developed by one of these authors had turned out to be truly important within Luhmann's own work, and yet the "effects of authority" that his very serious quotes produced were nothing short of hilarious. For Luhmann's readers, with that self-flagellating attitude in which we academics so like to indulge, quite regularly attributed the experience that they had never heard of those seeming "authorities" to their own lack of intellectual cosmopolitanism. This is why, until the present day, some departments of sociology or philosophy in Germany have Spencer Brown or Guenter specialists on their payrolls, and this also explains why some of those authors have had moments of intense reception [End Page 22] in the world of the humanities and social sciences at German universities. Among them, Humberto Maturana, together with his co-author the late Francisco Varela, seem to be the exception confirming the rule that none of those Luhmann references had the intellectual power to survive Luhmann himself.Now why should one trust Luhmann's trust in Maturana? The debate about the importance of Luhmann's thought (he labeled it a "theory of social systems") in the larger context of contemporary Western philosophy has barely begun to become serious, and we are certainly many years away from a definitive consensual evaluation. But there are two—very different—features about Luhmann's work that make him fascinating at first glance. One lies in the simple fact that, probably, no other thinker since Hegel has managed to develop a restrained set of basic concepts and premises into a systematically coherent philosophical edifice of similar proportions. In this sense, entering the dimension of Luhmann's thought offers the patient reader a possibility to view many familiar positions and questions from sometimes radically different innovative angles. Less obvious, however, and more intriguing is Luhmann's intellectual bet to develop his systemic thought under strict avoidance of notions such as "subject," "subjecthood," or "agency." It was this very bet (about whose existential and political motivations he only left some rather vague remarks) that explains Luhmann's fascination for much theoretical thinking emerging from biological research, above all for Humberto Maturana's work. For from a biological perspective, subjecthood and agency are highly marginal attributes in the realm of living organisms. I believe that this (almost hidden) component in Luhmann's thinking can explain the particularly strong affinity of contemporary pedagogical thought in Germany with his work. Of course, such an affinity will not necessarily lead to a pedagogical theory that, in orthodox reliance on Luhmann, will... (shrink)

Everyfan -- Definitions : praise, beauty, athletics -- Discontinuities : demigods, gladiators, knights, ruffians, sportsmen, Olympians, customers -- Fascinations : bodies, suffering, grace, tools, forms, plays, timing -- Gratitude : watching, waste.

Conversation about expected translation into Ukrainian of Gumbrecht's book Production of Presence. What Meaning Cannot Convey (Stanford UP: Stanford, 2004).

Considering a range of present-day phenomena, from the immediacy effects of literature to the impact of hypercommunication, globalization, and sports, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht notes an important shift in our relationship to history and the passage of time. Although we continue to use concepts inherited from a "historicist" viewpoint, a notion of time articulated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the actual construction of time in which we live in today, which shapes our perceptions, experiences, and actions, is no (...) longer historicist. Without fully realizing it, we now inhabit a new, unnamed space in which the "closed future" and "ever-available past" (a past we have not managed to leave behind) converge to produce an "ever-broadening present of simultaneities." This profound change to a key dimension of our existence has complex consequences for the way in which we think about ourselves and our relation to the material world. At the same time, the ubiquity of digital media has eliminated our tactile sense of physical space, altering our perception of our world. Gumbrecht draws on his mastery of the philosophy of language to enrich his everyday observations, traveling to Disneyland, a small town in Louisiana, and the center of Vienna to produce striking sketches of our broad presence in the world. (shrink)

Summary Ordinary language philosophers frequently draw on the fact that an appropriately selected sentential combination of the form p but not q can, or cannot, be uttered without absurdity; however, they do so without sufficient reflection on the methodology of such combination tests, which results in considerable shortcomings even in practical application. To improve things, I shall discuss two criteria for distinguishing ‘pragmatic’ from ‘non-pragmatic’ implications and for separating the latter into ‘linguistic’ (‘semantic’ and ‘syntactical’) and ‘non-linguistic’ ones (2–3); consider (...) the bearing of the principle of ‘sense-constancy‘ on the applicability of combination tests (4); and call attention to the important, though merely heuristic, function of investigating pragmatic, as opposed to semantic, implications (5.1–5.2). Finally, I shall hint at a striking analogy between the linguistic (yet non-empirical) method of combination tests, the phenomenological method of ‘fictional variation’, and the empirical method of ‘conjectures and refutations’ (5.3). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 30.4 (2000) 83-101 [Access article in PDF] Martin Heidegger and his Japanese InterlocutorsAbout A Limit of Western Metaphysics Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht 1 Quite obviously, the central position that Western philosophical discourses have assigned, over the past two centuries, to the concept of "sense" hinges upon the epistemological dominance of the Subject/Object paradigm. In whichever specific ways this concept has been defined (and we all know how (...) confusing the range of those proposals has become), 1 it always ends up referring to the modalities in which an "Observer-Subject" can refer to what (s)he is observing as the "World of Objects." "Making sense," then, may be described as the selection, performed by an observer, of a specific object of reference among all the objects of which the world is believed to consist; or as the drawing of a line by which (s)he makes a distinction, at every given moment, between those parts of the world that (s)he is observing and those that (s)he is not observing; or as the positioning of a chosen topic within a preexisting context of possible associations. All these different descriptions can be turned into definitions of "sense making" as long as they point to the awareness that whatever has been chosen, divided, or contextualized could have been chosen, divided, or contextualized differently. Another way of evoking the same type of relation between what remains "potential" and what becomes "actual" would be to say that the concept of "sense" always refers to cases of entropy transformed into structure—under the condition that alternative patterns of transforming entropy into structure remain available. What we call the Subject's consciousness (Bewusstsein) is the place where these selections take place and where their alternatives are held available.If we consider the Subject/Object paradigm as the core element of that style of philosophizing which has been called (sometimes from a purely descriptive and sometimes from a critical angle) "Western metaphysics," then it is a both true and trivial conclusion to say that, within Western metaphysics, sense making is inevitable (that is, that Subjects cannot help producing sense and, also, that there can be no effects of sense without pointing to a Subject). An interesting case that proves the point of this implicational relationship is Niklas Luhmann's systems theory. Despite Luhmann's sustained effort to be epistemologically eccentric, despite all his great conceptual ambition to bypass the instance of the Subject, 2 his books (and, above all, their reception) make it [End Page 83] very clear how a philosophical discourse that gives as central a position to the concept of "sense" as Luhmann's cannot help producing Subject-effects. The frequently used everyday expression, on the other hand, that "something makes no sense" is not in conflict with our point about the inevitability of sense making within the metaphysical—and also within our Western everyday—framework of discursive presuppositions.For if we say that "something makes no sense," we are not using the word "sense" in accordance with the conventional philosophical meaning of "sense making," and we are thus not referring to individual phenomena that would "resist" individual acts of sense attribution. 3 Rather, when we say that "something makes no sense," we react to situations where a (shorter or longer) sequence of those elementary and inevitable acts of sense attribution does not produce an impression of "coherence" or "consistency"; we refer to situations where we lack a larger perspective from which we could subsume the results of different individual acts of sense making [see Hahn]. Astonishingly enough (or not astonishingly at all), all those loud intellectual slogans from a decade or two ago about the "death of the Subject" never reached this—altogether unsurprising—point: that any attempt at (or the mere historical process of) overcoming a Subject-centered epistemological tradition (or, with the more Heideggerian concept, of overcoming "metaphysics") would have to ask how one could—begin to—avoid sense making. On the contrary, that "weak subject" and that so-called "weak thinking" as which the Subject/Object paradigm seems to... (shrink)

Production of Presence is a comprehensive version of the thinking of Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, one of the most consistently original literary scholars writing today. It offers a personalized account of some of the central theoretical movements in literary studies and in the humanities over the past thirty years, together with an equally personal view of a possible future. Based on this assessment of the past and the future of literary studies and the humanities, the book develops the provocative (...) thesis that, through their exclusive dedication to interpretation, i.e. to the reconstruction and attribution of meaning, the humanities have become incapable of addressing a dimension in all cultural phenomena that is as important as the dimension of meaning. Interpretation alone cannot do justice to the dimension of "presence," a dimension in which cultural phenomena and cultural events become tangible and have an impact on our senses and our bodies. Production of Presence is a passionate plea for a rethinking and a reshaping of the intellectual practice within the humanities. (shrink)